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California v. FERC: Federal Supremacy
in Hydroelectric Power Continues
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, there has been a proliferation of new hydro-
electric power projects along United States waterways.' In addition,
many long-established projects will require relicensing between now
and the year 2000.2 This upsurge has produced growing tension
between the states, which are concerned over the environmental
impact of unfettered growth, and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), which oversees the licensing of hydropower
plants. 3 Widespread disenchantment with FERC's procedures has
led to a call for more state control over the country's water
resources.4 The courts, however, basing their decisions on the
Supreme Court's ruling in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative
v. FPC,5 have consistently held that state agencies must defer to
FERC's authority.6 In First Iowa, the Court ruled that federal
regulation of hydroelectric power under the Federal Power Act
(FPA)7 preempts all state laws relating to water usage, except those
I See Small Hydro Program: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Energy
Conservation and Power, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, 43-53 (1984) [hereinafter Small Hydro
Program] (letter from Raymond O'Connor, Chairman, FERC, Feb. 17, 1984, in answer to
question A.1).
2 Kirsch & Seitz, Environmental Protection Through Federal Preemption of State
Water Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10448 (Oct. 1990).
3 See Small Hydro Program, supra note 1, at 22, 23 (statement of Hon. James M.
Jeffords, Sept. 11, 1984).
4 See generally Small Hydro Program, supra note 1 (documenting discussions on the
issue); Blum, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role in Hydropower
Licensing, 10 HARv. EIrvTm. L. Rav. 1 (1986) (advocating pluralism in authorization proc-
ess).
328 U.S. 152 (1946).
6 See FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. FPC, 328
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964).
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-828(c) (1988). Part I is the original Federal Water Power Act
(FWPA) of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063. This Comment concerns provisions of the FWPA
as amended, and titled the Federal Power Act (FPA), ch. 687, 49 Stat. 863 (1935).
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governing the distribution or appropriation of water for irrigation
or municipal purposes.8
After First Iowa, the states and various environmental groups
supported amendments in Congress to change the FPA and lessen
federal supremacy over hydroelectric power. 9 When all attempts
failed, these groups, encouraged by commentators who reported a
change in the Court's position regarding preemption by federal
regulatory acts,' 0 turned to the judiciary for relief.
In 1987, the state of California directly challenged FERC's
jurisdiction over licensing requirements for hydroelectric power
plants." This argument reached the Supreme Court in California
v. FER C.12 In a unanimous decision, delivered by Justice O'Con-
nor, the Court upheld First Iowa and dealt a "death blow" to all
but limited state control over hydroelectric power development.' 3
The reaction to California v. FERC was swift. The ruling was
called a threat to a "century-old standard of state water .control, ' 14
and bills again were introduced in Congress to reverse the preemp-
tion of state law by federal regulation of hydroelectric power
development.' 5
Part I of this Comment examines the FPA and the Supreme
Court's decision in First Iowa.16 Part II reviews the decisions and
legislation subsequent to First Iowa.17 Part III discusses the history
and holding of California v. FERC.'8 Part IV discusses the effects
of the holding in California v. FERC, concluding that reliance on
the Supreme Court for a change in public policy was unfounded,
and that Congress is, and always has been, the proper forum for
amending the FPA. 9
' First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 175-76 (1946). Preemption of
state law occurs when either (1) Congress manifests the "intent to occupy a given field,
[and] any state law falling within that field is pre-empted," or (2) Congress does not
"entirely displace[] state regulation over the matter in question," but preemption of state
law results when compliance with both state and federal authority is impossible. Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
9 See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
" Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership, 41 F.E.R.C. 61,198 (1987). For a discussion of
this litigation, see infra notes 85-109 and dccompanying text.
12 _ U.S. _ , 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990).
11 California v. FERC, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2033-34 (1990).
4 Sen. Jim McClure (R. Idaho), Press Release 90:90 (June 28, 1990).
" See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 20-46 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text.
'8 See infra notes 85-130 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 131-76 and accompanying text.
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I. SUPERSEDURE OF STATE AUTHORITY UNDER THE FPA
A. The Federal Power Act
In 1920 Congress enacted the FPA to promote the comprehen-
sive development of water power. 20 The FPA created the Federal
Power Commission (FPC), subsequently called the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC),2 1 to control the regulation of
hydroelectric power on the nation's navigable waters. 22 The Su-
preme Court has given a broad interpretation to the concept of
"navigable waters," placing virtually all hydroelectric power pro-
jects under the authority of FERC.23
The FPA gives FERC the power to issue licenses for the con-
struction of "dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power houses,
transmission lines, or other project works necessary or convenient
for the development and improvement of navigation and for the
development, transmission, and utilization of power ... ."24 Be-
fore a license may be issued, however, FERC must consider whether
the project is "best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving
or developing a waterway." 25 If necessary, the Commission may
order the licensee to modify its plans to meet conditions imposed
by FERC. 26
Before the passage of the FPA, there was much debate in
Congress concerning the preemption of state water law.27 The states
20 See Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 408 (1975).
21 The FPC was terminated in 1977 and its functions regarding the development of
water power were transferred to FERC. See 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (1982).
1 "Navigable waters" are "those parts of streams or other bodies of water over
which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce ... and ... are
used or suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property .... " 16 U.S.C. §
796(8) (1988).
2, See FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965); W. Fox, JR., FEDERAL-REGULATION
OF ENERGY § 32.05 (1983).
- 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1988).
- Id. § 803(a).
2 Id.
Rep. LaFollette's (R. Wash.) statements are indicative:
[Uinder the proposed law the would-be licensee is supposed to have procured
all concessions and necessary powers of the State or States in which the project
is situated before a license can be issued, thus harmonizing State and Federal
interests, making development possible without transgressing the sovereign
powers of the States or conferring on the Federal Government any plenary
power not contemplated by the Constitution.
56 Cong. Rec. 9,110 (1918), quoted in Petitioner's Opening Brief at 32, California v. FERC,
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2024 (1989) (No. 89-333).
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promoted a comprehensive federal plan for the development of
water resources, 28 while attempting to retain control over their
traditional spheres of water distribution and appropriation. 29 Con-
gress tried to mollify the states by inserting two provisions in the
Act that deal directly with state water rights.3 0 Section 27 requires
that a licensee produce evidence that he has complied with state
laws in respect to the "appropriation, diversion, and use of water
for power purposes. ' 31 Section 9 states that the FPA should not
be interpreted as "intending to affect or in any way to interfere
with the laws of the respective States relating to the .control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water .... -32
B. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC
The two sections that were intended to save state water rights
were first interpreted by the Supreme Court in First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. FPC.33 The cooperative applied for a license
to construct a hydroelectric power plant on the Cedar River in
Iowa.34 The FPC granted Iowa permission to intervene; the state
opposed the granting of the license.35 Iowa claimed that First Iowa
Hydro-Electric had not complied with the terms of the Iowa State
Code.36 Confronted with Iowa's claim that the cooperative must
meet both the requirements of the FPA and Iowa state law, the
Commission dismissed the license application, without prejudice,
for judicial determination. 37
23 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 180 (1946).
2 Whittaker, The Federal Power Act and Hydropower Development: Rediscovering
State Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities, 10 HAxv. ENVTL. L. Rsv. 135, 150-51 (1986).
30 See generally First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 174-75 (explaining Congressional intent in
sections 27 and 9).
31 16 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) (1988).
32 Id. § 821.
31 328 U.S. 152.
3 Id. at 157.
35 Id. at 159.
36 Id. at 161. The Iowa Code provided:
No dam shall be constructed, maintained, or operated in this state in any
navigable or meandered stream for any purpose, or in any other stream for
manufacturing or power purposes, nor shall any water be taken from such
streams for industrial purposes, unless a permit has been granted by the
executive council to the person, firm, corporation, or municipality construct-
ing, maintaining, or operating the same.
Id. at 164 (quoting IOWA CODE § 7767 (1939)).
3, Id. at 162. The Commission felt that a court was the appropriate forum in which
to decide the necessity of compliance with state law as a prerequisite for granting a license.
Id. at 161-62.
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The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the
FPA, including Congress' rejection of a proposal that would have
required a state's consent before the Commission granted a per-
mit,38 and determined that Congress intended a dual system of
jurisdiction over water power, with the federal government having
superiority over any state agency.39 The Court stated that securing
a permit from the state of Iowa should not be a "c6ndition
precedent" to obtaining a federal license. 40 Holding that section
9(b) of the FPA did not require compliance with state laws, the
Court interpreted this section as suggesting considerations "as to
which the Commission may wish some proof submitted to it of the
applicant's progress. ' 41 Requiring the cooperative to comply with
state laws before being granted a federal license would, the Su-
preme Court reasoned, give Iowa veto power over the project and
"destroy the effectiveness of the federal act.''42
The Court distinguished section 27 from 9(b) as a "saving"
clause as to state property laws governing water use. 43 But the
Court limited the effect of section 27 "to laws as to the control,
appropriation, use or distribution of water in irrigation or for
municipal or other uses of the same nature." 44 The Court empha-
11 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 179. The Court noted that the Shields Bill (introduced by
John Shields (D. Tenn.)), S. 1419, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917), contained the following
language which was not enacted: "IT]he permittee must first obtain, in such manner as
may be required by the laws of the States, the consent of the State or States in which the
dam or other structure for the development of the water power is proposed to be con-
structed."
"1 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 167-68.
,0 Id. at 170. The Court said, in part:
It is a procedure required by the state of Iowa in dealing with its local streams
and also with the waters of the United States within the State in the absence
of an assumption of jurisdiction by the United States over the navigability of
its waters. Now that the Federal Government has taken jurisdiction of such
waters under the Federal Power Act, it has not by statute or regulation added
the state requirements to its federal requirements.
Id.
I 4 Id. at 177-78.
41 Id. at 164.
Id. at 175.
" Id. at 175-76. In addition, the Court said the following, about section 27:
It therefore has primary, if not exclusive reference to such proprietary rights.
The phrase "any vested right acquired therein" further emphasizes the appli-
cation of the section to property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to
suggest a broader scope unless it be the words "other uses." Those words,
however, are confined to rights of the same nature as those relating to the
use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.
Id. at 176.
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sized the national purpose of the act, based on the federal govern-
ment's broad powers to regulate commerce45 and the preemption
of Iowa state law by the FPA.46
II. PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AFTER First Iowa
The 1980s brought a call from commentators, congressmen,
and environmentalists to allow more state control of the licensing
of hydroelectric power plants. 47 First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop-
erative v. FPC and federal supremacy over hydropower regulation
were attacked on two fronts. First, cases decided subsequent to
1946 were heralded as an indication that First Iowa eventually
would be overruled. 48 Second, legislation was introduced in Con-
gress to amend the FPA directly.4 9
A. Judicial Developments Subsequent to First Iowa
Proponents of states' water rights detected a softening of the
Supreme Court's position regarding preemption in two cases de-
cided several years after First Iowa.50 California v. United States5'
dealt with the Reclamation Act of 190252 and Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission 3 concerned regulation under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. 54
In California v. United States, the United States Bureau of
Reclamation applied for a permit from the California State Water
Resources Control Board to appropriate water, which would later
be used for reclamation, for the New Melones Dam.55 The State
41 The United States Constitution grants Congress the right to regulate interstate
commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 182.
4 See generally Small Hydro Program, supra note I (documenting discussions on the
issue); Blum, supra note 4 (advocating pluralism in authorization process).
4s See infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
10 See Comment, Small Hydroelectric Projects and State Water Rights, 18 PAC. L.J.
1225, 1236 (1987). See generally Plouffe, Forty Years After First Iowa: A Call for Greater
State Control of River Resources, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 833, 833 (1986) (advocating amend-
ment of FPA to require FERC licensing to be consistent with federally approved state
plans).
3, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
52 32 Stat. 388 (codified throughout 43 U.S.C.).
53 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
14 68 Stat. 919 (codified throughout 42 U.S.C.).
" California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 652 (1978).
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Board approved the application, but attached twenty-five condi-
tions to the permit.16 The most important condition prohibited full
impoundment until the Bureau indicated how it would use the
water, as required by California law.57 The United States then
obtained a declaratory judgment in federal district court stating
that it could impound unappropriated water that was necessary for
a federal reclamation project without complying with state law.5 1
The Supreme Court held that section 8 of the 1902 Act required
the Secretary of the Interior to comply with state law in the
"control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water." 5 9 The Court
relied on legislative history to conclude that "Congress intended to
defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state water law."'' 6
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court again faced the question of
federal preemption of state law. California had passed a statute
conditioning the construction of nuclear power plants on the State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission's
determination that adequate storage and disposal facilities for nu-
clear waste were available. 6' Two utility companies filed an action
in district court to declare the provision preempted by the Atomic
Energy Act.62 The Supreme Court, accepting California's argument
that its statute was motivated by economic rather than safety
' Id. Some of the conditions were the prohibition of the collection of water during
certain periods of the year, provisions to protect fish and wildlife, and the filing of additional
reports. Id. at n.8.
5' Id. at 652-53.
5' Id. at 647. As a matter of comity, the district court did require the United States
to comply with the state's application process. Id.
11 Id. at 675. Section 8 states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to
in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying
out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws,
and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the
Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in,
to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof.
-43 U.S.C. § 383 (1982).
0 California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 675. The Court said that the Secretary
"should follow state law in all respects not directly inconsistent with [congressional] direc-
tives." Id. at 678. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to ascertain whether the
conditions imposed were consistent with congressional directives as to the New Melones
Dam. Id. at 679.
61 CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977).
61 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 198 (1983).
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considerations, 63 held that Congress had intended a dual system of
nuclear energy regulation. 4 The federal government was to oversee
the radiological safety aspects involved in the licensing of a nuclear
plant, while the states reserved the right to determine questions of
cost, need, reliability and other related concerns.6 5 The decisions
in Pacific Gas and California v. United States were viewed by
those concerned with state jurisdiction under federal regulatory
schemes as an indication that the Court might look with greater
favor on concurrent powers for state and federal government. 66
B. Legislative Assaults on First Iowa
Several bills introduced in Congress in the 1980's sought to
amend section 27 directly or to change other sections of the FPA
to allow states more control over license issuance. Representative
Jeffords from Vermont introduced a 1985 bill that would have
added a new section to allow state authorities to review and ap-
prove all license applications for hydroelectric projects with a 15,000
or less kilowatt power producing capacity.67
In 1983, the Western States Water Council, representing 12
western states, suggested amendments to sections 9(b) and 27 to
prevent preemption of state law by the FPA.68 The phrase, "and
to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power pur-
poses," was to be struck from section 9(b)69 of the Act. A new
subsection would have contained the statements: "ITihe commis-
sion is prohibited from issuing an original or new license ...
unless the applicant proves acquisition, in accordance with appli-
cable substantive and procedural provisions of state law, of the
necessary rights established pursuant to state law to appropriate,
6 Id. at 216.
4 Id. at 205.
5Id.
61 See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 41, California v. FERC, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2024
(1990) (No. 89-333) [hereinafter Petitioner's Opening Brief] (citing Pacific Gas); Comment,
Hydroelectric Power, the Federal Power Act, and State Water Laws: Is Federal Preemption
Water Over the Dam?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1179, 1197-1205 (1984) (citing Pacific Gas
and California v. United States).
7 H.R. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Feb. 27, 1985). This proposed
law also would have authorized state governors to designate a state authority to cooperate
with the Commission regarding state approval and review of license applications. The bill
was never enacted.
1, Comment, The Federal Power Act and Western Water Law-Can States Maintain
Their Own Water Use Priorities?, 27 NAT. REsotRcEs J. 213, 231 (1987).
69 16 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) (1988).
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divert, and use water for power purposes. ' 70 Two of the new
subsections added to section 27 would have read:
(c) Appropriation of water for power purposes subject to this
Part shall be pursuant to substantive and procedural provisions
of State statutory law, decisional law, and regulations governing
appropriation, diversion and use of water.
(d) Establishment of, and compliance with, pursuant to State
law, terms or conditions, including licenses, or other entitlements
for appropriation, diversion or use of water for power purposes,
shall not be deemed to constitute a burden on interstate com-
merce.
7
'
In addition to these attempts at amendment, when Congress
passed the first significant revision of the FPA licensing procedures,
the Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA),72 several
efforts were made to add provisions that would have given states
more control over hydropower development. One such bill, the
State Comprehensive River Planning Act, 73 would have allowed
states to develop comprehensive plans to control hydroelectric
power, which, if approved by FERC, would govern the licensing
of power projects.
During the Senate ECPA debate, Senator Max Baucus of Mon-
tana deferred introducing "controversial" amendments to the bill,
and agreed instead to a hearing on the issue of preemption of state
water rights.7 4 Before the Senate adopted a resolution, including
the proposed Western States Water Council amendments, he stated
in the Congressional Record:
I believe that section 27 of the original Federal Power Act artic-
ulated Congress' intent not to preempt State water law. Instead,
under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the law,
FERC is only required to consider State resource plans and the
recommendations of appropriate State agencies when evaluating
license applications. 75
70 Hydroelectric Project Licensing/State Water Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Water and Power of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1986) [hereinafter Hydroelectric Project].
71 Hydroelectric Project, supra note 70, at 27-28.
7 Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a), 8030) (1988)
(partially codifying this act).
7 S. 2361, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced by Senator Mitchell (D. Me.),
Feb. 28, 1984).
74 Hydroelectric Project, supra note 70, at 176.
7 Id.
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Additional testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources suggested that First Iowa was incorrectly
decided. The Director of the Montana Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation testified that Congress should "ex-
amine and resolve the many problems caused by the Supreme
Court's misinterpretation of the Federal Power Act in First Iowa.' '76
The past chairman of the Interstate Conference on Water Policy
declared, "The Federal Power Act was originally crafted in full
recognition of state authority with regard to control, appropriation,
and distribution of water .... Judicial and administrative actions
have narrowly interpreted the provisions of the Federal Power Act,
jeopardizing the states' ability to exercise their sovereignty over
state waters.
' 77
In order to mitigate damage to fish and scenic waterways,
environmental groups also petitioned Congress to change the FPA
to allow for more state control of licensing hydroelectric power
plants. In a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Energy
Conservation and Power, a representative of ten conservation groups
called for greater deference to state law in hydropower licensing
where state policy "has established instream flow requirements to
protect recognized natural and cultural values.' '78 At the same
hearing, counsel for the National Wildlife Federation in Oregon
asked for a "repeal of the First Iowa holding," stating, "Federal
government should not jam hydro projects down the throats of
unwilling states." 79 He characterized FERC's approach to hydroe-
lectric licensing as "power first/fish last." 80
When Congress finally passed the ECPA, it included several
provisions aimed at minimizing damage to fish and wildlife. The
ECPA requires FERC to consider the "adequate protection, miti-
gation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife," along with other
factors such as irrigation, flood control, and water supply, before
76 Id. at 86.
" Id. at 44.
71 Small Hydro Program, supra note 1, at 438 (testimony of David R. Conrad on
behalf of American Rivers Conservation Council, Environmental Action, Environmental
Policy Institute, Friends of the Earth, Friends of the River, National Audubon Society,
National Parks and Conservation Association, National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club,
and Wilderness Society).
Id. at 500-501 (Testimony of Terence L. Thatcher, counsel for the National Wildlife
Federation at its Pacific Northwest Resource Center in Portland, Or.).
I1 d. at 473.
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issuing a license for a hydropower project. 81 While FERC must
consult with state and federal fish and wildlife agencies, it may
disallow their recommendations upon publishing a finding that they
are inconsistent with the Act or with other law and that the
Commission has adequately complied with conditions of section
100).12 Congress amended the FPA to require FERC to consider
various environmental factors, but it did not modify the language
of section 27 in respect to state water law,83 nor did it require
FERC to defer to comprehensive plans before granting a license.8 4
III. California v. FERC
A. Procedural History
In 1983, FERC issued a license for a hydroelectric project to
be built on Rock Creek, a small tributary of the South Fork
American River, in El Dorado County, California.8 5 In order to
protect trout in the stream, the license required that the project
maintain interim minimum flow rates of eleven cubic feet per
second (cfs) from May through September and fifteen cfs from
October through April.8 6 The licensee also was required to conduct
studies, after consultation with the California Department of Fish
1 16 U.S.C. § 803(a). This section states, in part:
[T]he project adopted ... will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of
interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-
power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement
of fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for
other beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood control, water supply,
and recreational and other purposes ....
Id. See generally Bornong, The Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986: Changes in
Hydro Licensing?, 23 GONZ. L. REv. 135 (1987-88) (discussing intent and probable effects
of FPA amendments).
16 U.S.C. § 8030) (codifying § 10(j)).
83 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1988).
14 FERC can consider comprehensive plans, but it "must maintain its role as an
independent regulatory agency with a national, and not just a regional or river basin
perspective." Small Hydro Program, supra note I, at 80 (letter from Raymond J. O'Connor,
Chairman, FERC, in answer to question F.2.a).
"' Joseph M. Keating, 23 F.E.R.C. 62,137 (1983). The original license was issued
to Joseph M. Keating on April 29, 1983. The license was transferred to Rock Creek Limited
Partnership on September 10, 1985. Joseph M. Keating, 32 F.E.R.C. 62,566 (1985).
Joseph M. Keating, 23 F.E.R.C. 62,137, at 63,204. Inadequate instream flows
harm existing fish and wildlife habitats and the natural qualities of the affected rivers. See
generally Small Hydro Program, supra note 1, at 728.
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and Game (CDFG), to enable FERC to set permanent flow rates.8 7
In 1985, the Rock Creek Limited Partnership recommended that
FERC permanently adopt the interim flow rates.88 The CDFG
recommended much higher flow rates to the Commission.8 9
In 1984, the partnership also applied for a state water permit
from the State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB)Y0 The
WRCB approved, on an interim basis, the minimum flow rates
established by FERC, but reserved jurisdiction to set different
permanent rates. 91 While the WRCB was conducting a hearing to
establish permanent flow rates, the Rock Creek Limited Partner-
ship petitioned FERC for an order declaring that the Commission
had exclusive jurisdiction to set minimum flow rates. 92 The part-
nership claimed that the higher flow rates set by the WRCB would
be an economic hardship on the project. 93
In March 1987, FERC issued a declaratory order requiring the
partnership to comply with FERC's flow rates and stating that
California "ha[d] no authority to set minimum flows for the
project that conflict with those contained in the license. ' 94 FERC
claimed that allowing states to determine minimum flow rates
would, in essence, give them veto power over projects, thus con-
travening the Supreme Court's decision in First Iowa Hydro-Elec-
tric Cooperative v. FPC.95
In its March 1987 order, FERC also scheduled hearings to set
the permanent minimum flow rates for the project.96 After hearing
7 Joseph M. Keating, 23 F.E.R.C. 62,137, at 63,204.
11 Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership, 38 F.E.R.C. 61,240 (1987).
,9 Brief for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Opposition at 3a, California
v. FERC, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990) (No. 89-333) [hereinafter Brief for FERC in
Opposition]. Specifically, the CDFG recommended minimum flow rates of 30 cfs from
October through February, and 60 cfs from March through September. Id.
10 California v. FERC, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2027.
91 Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 66, at 2-3. The State Board found that
Keating's instream study had failed to "consider most habitat types and stream areas
affected by the project," and required him to prepare a new study before commencing
construction. Id. at 2.
92 Id. at 3. At the conclusion of the hearing the WRCB adopted permanent flow rates
of 60 cfs from March through June and 30 cfs from July through February. See Rock
Creek Ltd. Partnership, 38 F.E.R.C. 61,240, at 61,772.
93 Id.
4 Id. at 61,773. The Commission said, "The imposition of minimum flow releases
for fishery protection and other purposes is an integral part of the Commission's compre-
hensive planning and licensing process," under FPA and, "the establishment of minimum
flows is a matter beyond the reach of state regulation." Id.
95 Id.
Id. at 61,774.
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testimony from the interested parties, the administrative law judge
set the minimum flow rate at 20 cfs for the entire year. 97
The WRCB then issued an order requiring the licensee to
comply with the minimum flow rates98 and requested intervention
and a hearing. 99 The Commission granted the intervention motion,
but denied a new hearing.: ° FERC concluded that by imposing
different minimum flow rate requirements, the state would defeat
the Commission's purposes of comprehensive planning under the
FPA.101
California petitioned for review, asking the court of appeals to
consider FERC's declaratory order and denial of rehearing. 02 The
Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's interpretation of FPA
section 27 in First Iowa evidenced the intent of Congress to give
FERC vast regulatory control over hydroelectric projects.' 3 Thus,
when the WRCB's powers to set minimum flow rates under state
law conflicted with congressional objectives, the WRCB was pre-
empted by the FPA.04 California then petitioned for certiorari,
which was granted on December 4, 1989.105
B. The Decision
In California v. FERC106 the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
of the Ninth Circuit. The Court declined to overrule First Iowa,
upholding the forty-four year old interpretation of FPA section
27.107 In addition, the Court labeled its ruling in California v.
United States as premised upon the Reclamation Act of 1902, and
hence not a disavowal of First Iowa10 8
Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership, 41 F.E.R.C. 63,019 (1987). Experts for the Rock
Creek Limited Partnership recommended a constant minimum flow rate of 15 cfs. CDFG
recommended the higher rates of 30 cfs in the winter months and 60 cfs in the summer
months. CDFG maintained that low flow levels would raise water temperatures. Id. at 65,
121.
1 California v. FERC, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2028.
9 Brief for FERC in Opposition, supra note 89, at 7.
110 Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership, 41 F.E.R.C. 61,198 (1987).
101 Id.
,02 Congress provided for review of FERC decisions in the federal courts of appeals.
See 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1988).
103 California v. FERC, 877 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, U.S. , 110 S. Ct.
2024 (1990).
1o4 Id. at 750.
California v. FERC, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 536 (1989).
U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2024.
Id. at 2029.
Id. at 2032.
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1. First Iowa and Stare Decisis
California argued that section 27 of the FPA specifically barred
FERC from total control over minimum flow requirements.' 9 The
section states:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as af-
fecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the
laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal
or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein. 10
California argued that "other uses" should require the Rock Creek
project to comply with the state's minimum rates independent of
its obligation to follow FERC's requirements."'
The Supreme Court conceded that if the issue had been a
question of first impression, California's interpretation of the stat-
ute could be a "close question," stating that a state's minimum
flow requirements might be thought of as "other uses" relating to
the "generation of power or the protection of fish.1" 2 In addition,
the Court said this reading would coincide with the Courts' pre-
sumption, absent clear congressional intent, against finding pre-
emption of state law."' However, the Court refused to disturb its
interpretation of section 27 as set forth in First Iowa. 14 The Court
found "no sufficient intervening change in the law, or indication
that First Iowa has proved unworkable or has fostered confusion
and inconsistency in the law, that warrants our departure from
established precedent. '" 5
109 See Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 66, at 8-12.
"o 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1988) (emphasis added).
I Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 66, at 10.
112 California v. FERC, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2028-29.
13 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2029.
"4 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2029. The Court stated:
[California] misconceives the deference this Court must accord to long-standing
and well-entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that un-
derlie complex regulatory regimes. Adherence to precedent is, in the usual
case, a cardinal and guiding principle of adjudication, and "[c]onsiderations
of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power
is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done."
Id. at __ 110 S. Ct. at 2029.
"I Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2029-30.
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2. The Interpretation of Section 27 in First Iowa is Not Dictum
The Supreme Court rejected California's argument that the
Court's discussion of section 27 in First Iowa was merely dictum. 11 6
The Court acknowledged that First Iowa was primarily concerned
with the interpretation of section 9(b), but found that only a
"narrow reading" of section 27 could have led to the conclusion
that licensees were not required to obtain state permits or comply
with state laws that were preempted by federal regulation.11 7 Ac-
cepting FERC's argument, the Court reasoned:
Had § 27 been given the broader meaning that Iowa sought, it
would have "saved" the state requirements at issue, made the
state permit one that could be issued, and supported the inter-
pretation of § 9(b) as requiring evidence of compliance with those
state requirements, rather than compliance only with those re-
quirements consistent with the federal license."' s
The Court stated that First Iowa's narrow construction of section
27 was necessary to the general holding in the case.1 9 To the
Court, by rejecting concurrent jurisdiction and mandated compli-
ance with state permit requirements, First Iowa upheld only limited
state participation in hydroelectric project licensing,1 20 and by in-
terpreting section 27 as dealing only with state proprietary rights,
the First Iowa Court found this restriction of the states' role in
regulation consistent with congressional intent.12'
116 Id. at __, 110 S. Ct. at 2030-31. In its brief, California stated:
The First Iowa Court distinguished section 9(b) from section 27, stating
that the latter provision, unlike the former, requires substantive compliance
with state water law .... The Court then commented on section 27 itself,
stating that the reference to "irrigation," "municipal" and "other uses"
implies that provision is limited to "proprietary rights" and thus does not
authorize state "regulation" of hydropower uses .... Since the Court held
only that section 9(b) does not require a state permit as a "condition prece-
dent" to a FERC license, the Court's comments concerning section 27 were
dictum.
Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 66, at 37.
California v. FERC, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2030-31.
"' Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2030-31. FERC advanced this argument in its brief: "If
Section 27 preserved the Iowa statute requiring that any water taken from the stream be
returned at 'the nearest practicable place,' then the Court could not have held that Iowa
was without authority to insist on compliance with that provision." Brief for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission at 13, California v. FERC, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990)
(No. 89-833) [hereinafter Brief for FERC].
-t California v. FERC, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2031.
120 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2031.
2 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2031-32.
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3. California v. United States-Not an Abandonment of First
Iowa
The Supreme Court also dismissed California's argument that
California v. United States'22 was a rejection of First Iowa.-3
Noting that California v. United States interpreted the Reclamation
Act of 1902, and was not an assessment of the FPA, the Court
reasoned that both the California v. United States Court and the
First Iowa Court had studied the legislative histories and purposes
of the respective Acts and had discerned that "the FPA envisioned
a considerably broader and more active federal oversight role in
hydropower development than did the Reclamation Act. ' 124
Furthermore, the Court stated that the crucial language of FPA
section 27, "other uses," was missing from section 8 of the Rec-
lamation Act. 25 Since minimum flow rate requirements do not
reflect a recognized proprietary right, 126 the language in section 8
referring only to "water used in irrigation" would defeat a critical
element of California's argument.1 27 Observing that legislative his-
tory had been studied previously in First Iowa, the Court declined
to reexamine section 27 in view of the considerations favoring its
support. 28
4. State and Federal Instream Flow Requirements Cannot
Coexist
The Supreme Court agreed with FERC's contention that allow-
ing a state to impose minimum flow requirements would defeat
Congress' intent to give the Commission broad powers to set
11 For a discussion of that case, see supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
2 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2032.
2 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2032.
121 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2033.
116 Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2029.
'" Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2029. The words "other uses" were a crucial aspect of
California's argument. California's water law is based predominantly on prior appropriation.
See Comment, State's Rights in Hydroelectric Development: The Interrelation Between
California Water Law and Section 27 of the Federal Power Act, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 535,
547 (1984). Prior appropriation is based on the premise that "the first user to put water to
beneficial use has a water right that is superior to all those who come after him." L.
McGuioAN, LEGAL IssuEs AFs~cmn~o THE DEVELOPMENT OF Low-HEAD HYDROELECTRIC
POWER 17 (1980). California courts have not recognized instream flow requirements as a
beneficial use that gives rise to proprietary rights. See Fullerton v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
11 California v. FERC, U.S. at, 110 S.Ct. at 2029.
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licensing conditions and conduct comprehensive planning.' 29 Re-
jecting California's assertion that its own instream flow rates would
merely "supplement" FERC's requirements, the Court held that
state rates were preempted by federal law to the extent that they
conflicted with and obstructed congressional directives.130
IV. IMPACT OF CALFORNMA v. FERC
ON STATE RIGHTS UNDER THE FPA
The decision in California v. FERC gives the states notice that
the judiciary is an inappropriate forum for seeking relief from the
FPA's preemption of state water law. However, this should not
have surprised California. No intervening court decisions since First
Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC suggested that the Su-
preme Court would change its position in its interpretation of the
FPA, and efforts to modify First Iowa legislatively were also
unsuccessful.
A. The Attempts to Restrict Implications of First Iowa Were
Unjustified
In supporting its position, California, along with amici curiae
for 49 additional states and nine environmental groups, suggested
that the Supreme Court's discussion of section 27 in First Iowa
was dictum and inconsistent with legislative intent. 3' This belief,
supported by the decision in California v. United States, was based
on the supposition that the question of state water rights had not
been before the Court.'3 2
This belief was misplaced. Cases decided after First Iowa con-
sistently supported the proposition that the FPA supersedes state
law, except for instances involving certain proprietary rights re-
'11 Id. at, 110 S. Ct. at 2033-34.
I" Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2034. California had contended that there was no conflict
between the requirements of WRCB and FERC. By complying with the State Board's flow
rates, the Rock Creek project would necessarily comply with FERC's less stringent rates
and thus meet both state and federal obligations. Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 66,
at 48-49.
,", Brief for Amici Curiae States at 4-6, Brief of Amici Curiae American Rivers,
National Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, American Whitewater Affil-
iation, Friends of the River, Environmental Policy Institute, Trout Unlimited and Save Our
Streams at 20, California v. FERC, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990) (No. 89-333); see also
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
12 See Comment, supra note 66, at 1185; Comment, supra note 50, at 1235.
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served to the states.13 For example, the Supreme Court concluded,
in FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. ,134 that the FPA left
intact preexisting water rights, such as riparian rights, that are
traditionally determined by state law. 35 This express limitation on
the FPA had been considered previously in First Iowa.136 In its
discussion of the meaning of the FPA, the First Iowa Court relied
on statements made during congressional debate, saying, "[P]roperty
rights are within the State. It can dispose of the beds, or parts of
them, regardless of the riparian ownership of the banks ... .
The Court in Niagara Mohawk did not expand the First Iowa
interpretation of section 27 of the FPA to confer any more than
proprietary rights upon the states. 38
One year later, in 1955, the Court's decision in FPC v. Oregon 39
again emphasized that the FPC had exclusive jurisdiction to license
hydroelectric plants in holding that Oregon could not exercise a
veto "by requiring the State's additional permission."' 4 The Court
summarily dismissed any question as to the FPC's right to dictate
the terms on which a license for a hydropower project would be
granted. 41 Both FPC v. Oregon and Niagara Mohawk gave the
states notice that the Court's interpretation of the FPA, as es-
poused in First Iowa, had remained unchanged.
Contrary to some commentators' belief, in light of California
v. United States, 42 that the Supreme Court would overrule First
Iowa if given the opportunity, 143 the Court actually cited First Iowa
with favor following the decision. 144 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
33 See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958); Washington
Dept. of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954);
Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 728
(2d Cir. 1983).
347 U.S. 239 (1954).
,' FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 252-53 (1954). A riparian
water right is a property right to water emanating from the ownership of the land bordering
the watercourse. A. DAN TARLoCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsoRcas § 3 (1989).
'1 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC. 328 U.S. 152, 173-74 (1946).
,17 Id. at 174.
"I Niagara Mohawk, 347 U.S. at 256.
139 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
140 FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 445 (1955). Oregon had challenged the authority of
FPC to grant a license on reserved lands and the adequacy of the project's protection for
breeding fish. Id. at 437.
141 Id. at 444-46.
141 For a discussion of that case, see supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
141 See Arnold, Emerging Possibilities for State Control of Hydroelectric Development,
13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10135, 10143 (1983); Comment, supra note 66, at 1211.
I" Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765,
773 (1984); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 n.6 (1982).
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v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commis-
sion, the Court distinguished First Iowa, noting that Congress did
not intend to give the same comprehensive planning role to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it gave to FERC1 45 In Cali-
fornia v. United States, the Court cited neither section 27 nor First
Iowa, and section 8 of the Reclamation Act, the statute in question,
can be distinguished on its face from section 27. Section 8 provides,
"[T]he Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of
[the Reclamation Act], shall proceed in conformity with [state]
laws.' 14 The Court in California v. United States substantially
relied on that language. 47 There is, however, no comparable direc-
tive in the FPA. The First Iowa Court made clear that section 9(b)
of the Act, which contains the closest counterpart to the "in
conformity" language, "does not require compliance with any state
laws."1 48
Before California challenged FERC over the Rock Creek licen-
sure, one federal court had squarely considered whether California
v. United States had overruled First Iowa, rejecting that argu-
ment. 49 The court noted the differences in the histories and pur-
poses of the Reclamation Act and the FPA and concluded that
California v. United States and First Iowa were "consistent.' 50
To the court, both cases recognized the need to avoid duplicating
regulation, holding that states have proprietary rights over water,
a necessary local regulation, and that the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction over hydroelectric project licensing.51
B. The Failure to Obtain Legislative Help: Evidence of
Congressional Intent
Before turning to the judiciary, environmentalists and advo-
cates of state water rights had petitioned Congress to change the
preemption policy of the FPA. All attempts failed.152 California
argued that the First Iowa Court misinterpreted the legislative
,, Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 223 n.34 (1983).
1- 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1988).
,,' California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674-75 (1978).
'4 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 177.
141 McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134.
110 Id. at 1157.
d. at 1156-57.
112 See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
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intent behind the FPA. 3 However, for over forty years Congress
refrained from legislatively overturning First Iowa.
Although commentators and legislators asked Congress to amend
the FPA to allow state and regional comprehensive plans to be
binding on FERC, Congress rejected this option. In fact, the
passage of the ECPA reaffirmed Congress' intent that FERC pos-
sess broad power to regulate the issuance of hydroelectric power
plant licenses. The amendments to the FPA require FERC to
"consider" comprehensive plans prepared by federal or state agen-
cies, but "this provision is not intended to modify any existing
requirement of State or Federal law. '154
Additionally, section 10(j), while requiring FERC to either
include or publish findings regarding the failure to follow appli-
cable state fish and wildlife agency recommendations, did not
reduce the agency's plenary power to control licensing of hydro-
power projects.'55 The House Conference report stated: "[Section
10()] does not give [state] agencies a veto, nor does it give them
mandatory authority, such as is provided in section 30(c) of the
Federal Power Act .... FERC is empowered to decide license
terms and conditions.' ' 56
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court rejected the plea of
California and the amici curiae to overturn First Iowa. The Court
has demanded a "special justification" before it departs from the
doctrine of stare decisis.157 The Court, in First Iowa, referred to
the FPA as a "major change of national policy,"' 15 8 and suggested,
after a lengthy discussion of the Act's legislative history, that
federal supremacy over the regulation of hydroelectric power had
broad public support.159 With no change in public policy forthcom-
ing in Congress, California's appeal to the Supreme Court was
predicated on overturning an interpretation of a law that had given
rise to a complex regulatory scheme. However, the Court is "es-
pecially reluctant" to overturn precedents based on statutory con-
struction.' 6° As the Court implied in its decision, if California wants
"I California v. FERC, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2033.
11 H.R. REP. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2496, 2522-23.
McCarren, 549 F. Supp. at 1156.
356 H.R. CONT. REP. No. 934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2537, 2540.
,5, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
"I First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 180.
159 Id. at 180-81.
,6 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986).
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a change in federal preemption of regulation of hydroelectric pro-
jects, it must again turn to Congress for relief.61
C. A Return to Legislative Assaults After California v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
Several bills were introduced in Congress to amend the FPA
after the Supreme Court's decision in California v. FERC. One
bill, introduced in the Senate the following month, seeks to change
sections 9 and 27 directly. 62 Section 9 would be amended by adding
a new paragraph that states: "No license may be granted for any
project subject to the provisions of this Act unless the applicant
complies with all procedural and substantive requirements of the
laws of the State .. . in which the project is located . *... ,16
Section 27 would be amended to deny preemption of state law
specifically. 164 Although the press release that followed the intro-
duction of the legislation declared that it was "based upon [cor-
recting] an incorrect interpretation of the Federal Power Act," the
bill's provisions are similar to ones previously considered by Con-
gress. 165 Unless there is a basic congressional policy change, the
amendments are unlikely to receive much attention.
A second bill introduced in the Senate 66 takes a different
approach to preemption under the FPA. By amending the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 67 it intends to grant the
states a greater say in the licensing of hydropower plants. Section
401 of the FWPCA currently states:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
activity including, but not limited to, the construction or opera-
tion of facilities, which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency
a certification from the State ... that any such discharge will
16, See California v. FERC, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2030.
56 S.2805, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Sen. Jim McClure (R. Idaho) introduced this
bill on June 28, 1990.
163 Id.
'61 This amendment states: "Nothing in this Act nor in any other Act may be construed
to constitute a preemption or intent to preempt the procedural and substantive requirements
of state law .... Id.
"I See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
S. 3186, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Sen. Jeffords (R. Vt.) introduced this bill on
Oct. 11, 1990 [hereinafter S. 3186].
167 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988).
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comply with the applicable provisions [of other sections] of this
title. 168
Suggested as an "untapped source" for state control over
regulation of hydro plants, 169 the central question of section 401
and its application to hydroelectric projects is the meaning of "any
discharge." One section of the FWPCA defines a discharge as the
"discharge of a pollutant."' 170 However, it has been argued that
section 401 contains a broader definition of "discharge," and that
state laws dealing with water quality standards could be applied to
deny a license to a hydroelectric plant. 171
A recent court decision has held that FERC has the authority
under the FPA to review and approve state water quality standards
enacted pursuant to the FWPCA1 72 Citing First Iowa, the Third
Circuit ruled that federal regulations relating to pollution do not
fall within the permissible confines of state control as mandated
by section 27 of the FPA. 73 It appears that minimum flow rate
requirements, which California sought to impose on the Rock
Creek project, would fail under any interpretation of the FWPCA.' 74
The proposed amendment to section 401 of the FWPCA seeks
to add language that would encompass the state control denied in
California v. FERC. As amended, FWPCA would call for state
certification when there is "any water quality degradation or im-
pairment of designated uses recognized under State law.' 1 75 Addi-
tionally, an applicant for a federal license would have to certify to
the licensing agency that the activity will "achieve, maintain, and
protect such water quality and the designated uses identified in the
State's water quality standards."' 176 While this constitutes a new
approach to undoing First Iowa and California v. FERC legisla-
tively, it remains to be seen whether the additional support needed
in Congress will be forthcoming.
Ia id.
,6 Bodi & Erdheim, Swimming Upstream: FERC's Failure to Protect Anadromous
Fish, 13 EcOLOGY L.Q. 7, 44 (1986); see Arnold, supra note 143, at 10,141.
1-0 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (1988).
,7, See Hydroelectric Project, supra note 70, at 176.
172 Pennsylvania Dep't of Envrl. Resources v. FERC, 868 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1989).
173 Id.
114 See Scotch, Small Hydropower Development and the Environment: A Survey of
State and Federal Law, 5 VT. L. REv. 251, 267 (1980).
' See S. 3186, supra note 166.
176 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Today there are over 2,000 hydroelectric power plants licensed
by FERC, with many scheduled for renewal over the next ten
years.' 77 Under the regulatory scheme of the FPA, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v.
FPC, the states have little input in determining the conditions under
which hydropower projects receive federal licenses.178
Although many expressed outrage over the Court's decision in
California v. FERC, its affirmation of First Iowa was not unex-
pected. The Supreme Court is reluctant to overturn established
precedent, especially concerning statutory construction. 79 Further,
congressional intent as to the purpose of the FPA could be inferred
from the consistent failure of advocates for a policy change. Also,
the Court actually had relied on First Iowa in subsequent decisions,
instead of disavowing it, as had been theorized.'8 0
In the 1990s, the courts will offer the states no relief in their
conflict with FERC. The states and environmentalists must turn,
once again, to the halls of Congress for support. Given the new
legislation introduced subsequent to California v. FERC, it appears
that the states are prepared to pursue this avenue vigorously.
However, since all previous legislative efforts have been unsuccess-
ful, there must be a fundamental policy shift in Congress before
any change can be expected.
Jill K. Osborne
17 See supra note 2.
7 See Hydroelectric Project, supra note 70, at 7-9 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus,
Sept. 12, 1986).
'79 See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 144.
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